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By MMK NLDDE Date 2/12/14

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General Alfred M. Gruenther
Commander-in-Chief
Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers, Europe
APO 55, U. S. Army

Dear Al:

Willard Liebel came to see me last Wednesday, 21 October. Among other matters, he mentioned a conversation with you in which you referred to the conversation which I had with Schuyler, Schow, and Tufts during my last visit to Paris in early September. He said that he told you the draft letter which had been suggested for your signature following my conversation with Schuyler did not reflect views which I have expressed to him relative to the relationships existing between our organizations. He said that you had told him to get together with me and straighten the matter out.

I told Liebel that I had obviously not made my meaning clear and that Schuyler may have gotten an impression that I did not intend to convey. I had no intention in any way of reflecting upon the relations between Liebel's group and mine for they have been of the very best, both from personal and professional points of view. Liebel's group has enabled me to receive requirements on CIA for the support of SHAPE plans, although we have received them as U.S. EUCOM plans. The indirect arrangement has been satisfactory so far as U.S. UW requirements are concerned, and it has enabled us to make considerable progress. In my conversation with Schuyler, Schow, and Tufts, I certainly had no intention of reflecting in any way upon these accomplishments. If my comments conveyed any such impression, I would like to correct it.

In the second place, I told Liebel that I had no intention of suggesting that you recommend changes in the provisions of NSC 10/2 on behalf of CIA. That would obviously be most inappropriate because such recommendations on my part should be made to the Director, CIA. What I was pointing out to Schuyler was the fact that some of the provisions of NSC directives relative to control, command, and utilization of clandestine operations restrict you in your capacity as SACEUR in peacetime planning and preparations and will interfere with your utilization of (these assets in wartime. I described some of the ways in which restrictions impede clandestine planning on an international basis. Since these directives which limit U.S. clandestine resources to U.S. channels and control antedated the establishment of SHAPE, I suggested that they are not consistent with policies of international cooperation exemplified in U.S. support of NATO and SHAPE and might well be brought up to date. I remarked to Schuyler that if I had the

responsibility



responsibility of SACEUR, I would recommend that the directives be revised and brought into line with our international support programs such as MDAP, MAAG, and MSA, and added that I would have no objection to being quoted in relation to this matter.

Liebel said that he would show me some notes which he had made on SM-1531-53. The tenor of this paper came as a surprise to me. Later I was able to see the actual documents SM-1531-53 and a copy of the letter which had been prepared for your signature forwarding these documents to Washington. While there was no reason why I should have seen these documents while they were under discussion in EUCOM and at SHAPE, it is a matter of regret to me that I did not have that opportunity. I believe that I could have shown you that some of the views expressed, if applied as strict policy, will cause grave complications in creating and utilizing clandestine assets in support of SHAPE plans and will not be practicable under actual war conditions in Europe. For your own personal information and in amplification of views that I expressed to Schuyler, Schow, and Tufts, I would like to make a few brief comments which still seem valid to me.

A conclusion that "command, control, and organizational relationships proposed in the SHAPE documents are inconsistent with U.S. national policy" is true if NSC 10/2 is to be taken as the statement of the national policy with which the SHAPE papers are inconsistent. Since NSC 10/2 and NSCID 5 antedate SHAPE, it seems to me that these papers should not be considered the definitive statement of national policy in this respect. The U.S. is certainly wholeheartedly supporting NATO, SHAPE, and other international organizations.

It seems to me too that statements to the effect that national policy of the U.S. requires that the activities of U.S. UW forces will in active theaters of war where American forces are engaged be conducted under the direct command of American military commanders, that U.S. forces and resources for UW, although responsive to SACEUR, are instruments of national policy and must be continuously directed toward the attainment of national aims, and that Supreme Allied Commanders within NATO are limited to operational control of the U.S. clandestine resources operating in direct support of their military operations to that necessary to insure coordination, are open to some question on the basis of policy and at least require interpretation. U. S. military forces serve under the command of foreign officers in Allied commands, and U.S. officers participate fully in planning and preparatory work in Allied Headquarters and on staffs. It is to be presumed that both military and clandestine forces in Europe are to support the attainment of National aims. If the clandestine forces are to support national aims which are not included within the NATO and SHAPE concepts in Europe, what are these national aims? Integration of military forces into international command structures takes place without unduly disturbing the basic unity and integrity of U.S. organizational structures. Such integration of U.S. UW, PW, and CIA forces and resources into international command structures as may be necessary for the most effective utilization of clandestine assets

should



also be considered normal, in my opinion. As a matter of fact, it will be essential in many instances if full use is to be made of clandestine assets for the simple reason that in most cases these assets and resources are generated on a multipartite basis.

It is no doubt true that the SHAPE documents under consideration do propose intermediate international organizations and responsibilities for the exercise of direct command over U.S. military UW and PW forces and coordination and control over CIA which are beyond that necessary to insure coordination. However, it seems obvious to me that there will be many occasions when a control beyond that necessary to insure coordination will be necessary and even mandatory.

Any conclusion that SACEUR requirements for U.S. wartime operations in the clandestine fields as well as requirements for peacetime preparations by U.S. forces should be placed directly upon U.S. military commanders responsible for the planning of such operations in support of SACEUR without reference to the CPC, overlooks the fact that coordination of clandestine operations of two or more nations will be required in these operations and that this coordination can only be achieved by close association among the clandestine services involved. It cannot be done by an overt U.S. military staff section on a unilateral basis. Most of the clandestine assets which have been developed in the SHAPE area have been developed on bipartite, tripartite, or multinational basis and can only be expended in accordance with agreements among the clandestine services concerned. Most of the assets to be developed in future will require close cooperation of one or more nations. The peculiar nature of clandestine assets practically precludes their generation in the SHAPE area by U.S. agencies unilaterally to meet U.S. requirements only.

Preservation of the organizational integrity of U.S. UW, PW, and clandestine organizations and resources under the direct command of U.S. commanders would be entirely appropriate, of course, if SACEUR were to allocate areas of responsibility on a national rather than an Allied basis. Such a policy would be satisfactory perhaps if it were to be interpreted with sufficient flexibility to meet the exigencies of possible situations, such as, for example, the joint utilization of jointly developed assets.

Direct planning coordination between SHAPE and the commanders of U. S. commands on all matters related to preparations for and conduct by U. S. forces of UW operations in support of SACEUR military operations will satisfy many requirements, of course, However, to retain the CPC as an advisory and liaison body without any possibility of development into a coordinating authority over elements of the clandestine services will preclude coordination between the national clandestine services. Lack of coordination in this sensitive field can have only one result; it will deprive SACEUR and Allied commanders of valuable assistance which should be within the capabilities of these services. This limitation would, in my

opinion,



opinion, eliminate any necessity for the CPC so far as the U.S. is concerned. Any organization with such a limited charter and capabilities would be a waste of manpower and time that might better be spent elsewhere.

All of these discussions have omitted any reference to what is perhaps the most important aspect of clandestine operations--clandestine intelligence. This is perhaps natural because SHAPE plans up to now have been primarily concerned with retardation and the utilization of UW in connection therewith. The fact that the charter of Liebel's group is limited to these UW aspects is a contributing factor no doubt. So far as the clandestine services are concerned, the functions of clandestine intelligence and these other activities are very closely related, so closely so that it would be difficult to separate them in operational planning.

CIA has done much during the past few years in close cooperation with clandestine services of other nations to develop assets and potentials in the SHAPE area. It is my considered opinion that adoption of and a strict adherence to these unilateral policies will negate much that has been accomplished up to this time and will make cooperation with other national clandestine services ineffective if not impossible, except perhaps in U.S. military areas. Application of these unilateral policies will in some measure at least abrogate existing agreements with clandestine services of other nations, and will preclude CIA from entering into any further agreements with clandestine services for developing clandestine assets.

I am sorry that I did not have the opportunity of discussing some of these details with you before you forwarded your comments on the JCS papers. I regret that I was not aware of developments before such definitive action was taken. After all, I am still an Army officer even though retired. Even though I am presently representing CIA here, I am sure that you know that my only interest in this whole field is what is best from the national point of view. I expect to be in Paris on 9 and 10 November for the next CPC meeting and would be glad to talk with you then at your convenience. I am, of course, bringing these matters to the attention of the Director.

With warm personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Lucian

L. K. TRUSCOTT, JR.
Lt. General, USA, Retired

