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By MMK NLDDE Date 12/27/11

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
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STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MAY 26, 1961 ON
DEFENSE MATTERS

This paper summarizes the initial views and suggestions of the United States Government resulting from its review of NATO Defense strategy and planning. It is our hope that these views, together with those of other governments, (particularly the British paper on NATO strategy), will be discussed fully and frankly in the Council, in coordination with the NATO military authorities through customary procedures.

NATO's General Defense Posture

Fundamental to our approach is the great importance of strengthening NATO's defense posture. The direct Soviet military threat to the NATO area is not diminishing despite changes in Soviet forces. We must not give the Soviet bloc any reason to think that they could gain their objectives by threatening or using force against Berlin or any part of the NATO area. The United States is firmly committed to a forward strategy in Europe. To this end, as the President has already indicated in his message to NATO, the United States intends to maintain the strength of its NATO forces in Europe.



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It seems unlikely that there would be any debate on these general propositions. The difficult questions are confronted in determining the most appropriate balance between nuclear and conventional forces and in working out the best arrangements for provision and control of nuclear weapons.

Balanced Forces

For several years, a high priority has in effect been given in NATO military programming to the development of nuclear-capable forces.

Although there has been no conscious decision to give conventional forces a lower priority, these forces have suffered considerably from inadequate allocation of resources. We believe there is now an urgent need to insure that the Alliance will in fact have a full range of forces to permit flexibility of response. It seems to us that NATO should have conventional forces strong enough to be able to force a pause in the event of substantial Soviet conventional aggression, and to prevent any Soviet miscalculation of our intentions.

This approach should not require any revision of the political directive or the strategic concept. These documents, which have served their purpose well, should rather be subject to a constructive interpretation in support of this approach along the lines that SACEUR has been developing. The magnitude and nature of the conventional forces required for this purpose would have to be worked out carefully in NATO. Although it may well be unnecessary to go beyond the general quantitative level of forces now planned in MC-70, it would clearly be necessary to strengthen conventional forces as a matter of the highest priority. Increased resources should be devoted to the achievement of high qualitative standards for these forces in manning levels, training, modernization of equipment

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Nuclear Weapons Requirements

NATO shield forces have achieved a very substantial nuclear capability.

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The question of how NATO requirements for additional nuclear weapons should be treated in a system of priorities is one for careful examination in NATO. Sufficient European resources are probably not available to meet all of the nuclear weapons requirements posed by the NATO commanders for deployment in Europe, and, at the same time, to enable any necessary strengthening of conventional forces. It will be necessary to review nuclear weapons requirements with this in mind, and efforts to meet these requirements would probably have to be adjusted at some point to be consistent with the priority to be accorded conventional forces.

[REDACTED]

For this reason, the United States reaffirms its intention to commit [REDACTED] submarines to NATO and also undertakes to commit to NATO, as they become available, additional [REDACTED] submarines planned for deployment in the NATO command areas. The exact number that this would involve, the areas of deployment and the NATO command arrangements to be adopted will require further study, although it would be understood that, in accordance with existing procedures, the United States would remain free to use these submarines in self-defense.

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and supply. It is primarily because of the importance of this task that, as the President stated recently to the Military Committee, the United States intends to maintain its own divisions and supporting units in Europe and to increase their conventional capabilities. In doing so, we would expect the other members of NATO, who are in a position to do so, to make a vigorous effort to provide the balance of required conventional forces at adequate strength. Where other members clearly need help in achieving their force goals, the United States is prepared to explore with these countries what might be provided most effectively in the form of military assistance.

The cost of meeting an entire range of requirements for all contingencies, such as those recommended by the NATO commanders, would probably be considerably in excess of what NATO is prepared to provide. Therefore, if we are to succeed in strengthening NATO's conventional forces, it will probably be necessary to develop a general system of priorities to ensure that the overall allocation of NATO resources will support the desired pattern of forces. The Council, working closely with the NATO military authorities, should be responsible for the development of this system of priorities. It should take full account of the possibilities for coordinated NATO research, development, and production of improved weapons and equipment for conventional forces, and for integration of logistics and training facilities. We also believe that the priorities should enable rapid progress in organizing and training the mobile task force that General Norstad has been planning.

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The NATO commitment of these submarines will make available to NATO a substantial portion of United States strategic forces for coverage of targets of importance in defending against an attack on Europe. This will of course have the effect of expanding the role of NATO-committed forces. It is impossible at this stage to indicate the extent to which the roles and missions of the submarine force might be divided between categories of targets. It may be that a definitive break-down cannot be developed. However, availability to NATO of this [REDACTED] submarine fleet will be a major factor in deterring Soviet attack against the Alliance.

This NATO commitment of United States [REDACTED] submarines will emphasize the indivisibility of the [REDACTED] defense of Europe and North America. The United States hopes it will lead toward further measures to strengthen North Atlantic area defense arrangements within the institutional framework of NATO.

The availability of such forces to NATO commands should postpone the time when it may be necessary to deal with the MRBM question which we are continuing to examine. Meanwhile, if other NATO members should be interested in contributing MRBM's to a multi-lateral NATO force after the non-nuclear goals have been met, we would welcome their views on how the NATO MRBM force concept that was suggested at the Ministerial meeting last December, might be carried out.

Control and Use of Nuclear Weapons

We have not yet been able to develop answers to all of the specific questions on control and use of nuclear weapons in the

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British paper on NATO strategy. However, we agree that these questions are important and should be considered carefully by NATO. Aside from questions relating to operational use of nuclear weapons, the problem of control and use can be divided between military controls on the one hand, and the problem of the basic decision on use on the other.


With respect to military control of nuclear weapons in Europe, we believe it is vital to insure that the use of these weapons will always be responsive to a deliberate and responsible political decision, and to provide for maximum possible security against sabotage and unauthorized or accidental expenditure. To this end, urgent and continuing attention should be given to improving present arrangements for physical security of installations, security and reliability of communications, and of weapons deployments.

On the problem of how the basic decision on use should be made, it is important to the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent that its use be subject to a clear line of authority able to make a quick decision if circumstances require. It is also important that the basic decision on use be made by responsible political authority. The United States would welcome any suggestions by other NATO members as to how a system of NATO control might be created over all NATO nuclear weapons, or some portion thereof, which would be responsible to these principles and which would ensure the most effective allied participation in that control.

One form that this might take could be the development by the Council of general guidelines regarding the use of nuclear weapons committed to NATO and/or of a political method to facilitate

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consultation and decision on use. The United States would undertake to observe any agreed guidelines or political method consistent with the principles indicated above.



The Council might endeavor to refine or extend these guidelines on use, with particular reference to the type of question posed in the British paper on NATO strategy.

Procedural Approach

In studying these general defense problems, it may be advisable for the Council to concentrate initially on the task of developing policy guidance to provide a basis for adjustment of on-going military programs.

As soon as a consensus of the Council has been reached on policy guidance, it will be necessary to decide what procedures should be followed in putting this guidance into effect. One procedural approach might be as follows:

The Council would develop a five-year projection of increased resources that might be made available for NATO defense programs on the assumption of a determined effort by all governments. The Council might then ask the NATO military authorities to design alternative military programs consistent with the Council's policy guidance and with two levels of resource availabilities: one corresponding to the Council's five-year projection and the other corresponding to present levels of military expenditures.

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With these alternative programs in hand, the Council could then reach a decision as to the magnitude and nature of defense programs that should be supported by governments in fulfillment of the Council's policy objectives.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION

APRIL 26, 1961

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